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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The United States maintains a vast network of overseas military installations to 
project American foreign policy, defend national interests, and provide tangible support 
to our regional and global security partners.  This network of installations spans six 
continents and provides the logistical and forward deployed presence required to support 
American military units stationed or engaged in overseas operations.   
The latest report released by the Department of Defense lists over 423 sites in 26 
countries outside the United States (Department of Defense, 2011).  Though these bases 
are spread throughout six continents, large portions are concentrated in just two 
countries:  Germany and Japan.  The United States established these bases at the end of 
World War II, and military personnel and equipment are frequently rotated between them 
while serving to project American power, stabilize traditionally unstable regions and 
protect the interests of the United States (Dur, 2000, p. 471; Overseas Basing 
Commission, 2005). 
Though seldom discussed domestically in the United States, these installations 
sometimes encounter fierce resistance or domestic debate in the host states questioning 
the role of foreign military forces in sovereign states far from their national lands 
(Johnson, 2004, p. 223-224; Johnson, 2007, p. 176-179).  Germany, serving as the 
industrial heart of Europe, has been able to successfully integrate United States military 
bases into society (Cunningham and Klemmer, 1995; Smoke, 1996, p. 305-306).  
However, the basing relationship in Japan has consistently been more problematic 
(Johnson, 2007, p. 176-179).  American military bases in Japan are not entirely 
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unwelcome (Foster, 2011), yet they have struggled, particularly in recent years, to 
become integrated into the country due to several unfortunate incidents of military 
personnel targeting local civilians.  At the crux of the basing issue in Japan is the 
stationing of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) on Okinawa, the southernmost 
prefecture of Japan (Johnson, 2007, p. 171-207; CNN, 2008).  The bases and stationing 
of this unit on Okinawa is the subject of considerable domestic debate within Japan, and 
between the United States and Japan.  These debates have resulted in several plans to 
relocate them within the prefecture of Okinawa or elsewhere in the Pacific.   
Current relocation plans fail to take into account several geostrategic factors 
concerning the regional United States military posture and the overarching role of United 
States military forces in Japan (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005).  This research seeks 
to address these oversights and present alternate basing options while also providing clear 
guidance on the mission and role of these forces.  Alternate basing options are crucial for 
the United States in order to maintain positive relations with Japan and, therefore, our 
military presence within its sovereign borders. 
The results of this thesis will offer alternate relocation strategies for American 
military units within Japan in support of the United States-Japan alliance and American 
foreign policy in the region.  Specifically, this thesis will provide an analysis for 
identifying locations within Japan to which the 3rd MEF may relocate, rather than to 
locations outside of Japan.  This research therefore seeks to identify locations within the 
main islands of Japan that could serve as a new home for the 3rd MEF whose presence on 
Okinawa has strained United States-Japanese relations for more than 20 years.  Given the 
increasing importance of East Asia in the world economy as a whole, and the United 
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States in particular (International Monetary Fund, 2011b), the need to maintain these 
forward deployed military units and serve as an “honest broker” (Ishihara, 2011, p. 3) in 
the region is of critical importance to the security of the United States.  Furthermore, the 
delicate balance of political-military relations in East Asia requires the presence of such 
an honest broker who can potentially balance the histories and dialogue between all 
states, regardless of past grievances. 
This study begins with a background and literature review of the factors and 
history relating to the basing of United States military units in Japan from theoretical, 
historical and operational standpoints. First, the history of United States-Japanese 
relations and the development of the modern treaty agreement is examined to understand 
United States interest in Japan.  Second, the domestic politics of Japan, post-World War 
II, and the role United States military forces have had on them are contextualized within 
the framework of East Asian security.  Third, the strategic uses of United States military 
forces in Japan are analyzed to operationalize the mission potential for these units and 
how their basing location affects the mission.  Finally, utilizing critical data from these 
sections, criteria were developed to examine the current base relocation plan for the 3rd 
Marine Expeditionary Unit on Okinawa.   
 Chapter Three provides an overview of the data sets and methodologies utilized 
within this study.  The Department of Defense Base Structure Report, an annually 
released account of United States military installations worldwide, is analyzed as the 
primary data set to understand the extent of overseas American military basing.  This will 
include analysis of base sizes or footprints, the primary use of the bases, financial costs 
and mapping of their location.  Next, locations and capabilities of Japanese military 
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installations within the main islands of Japan are examined and overlaid with United 
States military installations to provide possible locations for joint basing opportunities.  
Finally, capabilities of military equipment and transportation are mapped to determine the 
scope of response by American military units based upon proposed or alternate base 
relocations. 
Chapter Four provides a critical analysis, utilizing criteria developed in Chapter 
Two, of the current relocation plan of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit proposed by the 
Department of Defense through a comprehensive mapping of transportation capabilities 
and potential contingency operations.  Chapter Five presents an alternate relocation plan 
for the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit that satisfies the criteria established in Chapter 
Two and falls within suitable geographic distance of potential contingency operations. 
The Sixth Chapter summarizes the study results and presents recommendations 
for policy changes that address the noted deficiencies.  The conclusion and 
recommendations for future research are put forth in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 The role of American military forces in Japanese domestic affairs is not a 
development constrained to the post-World War II environment.  Clear contextualization 
of our mutual histories is concomitant to understanding the challenges facing our alliance 
today.  A concise account of United States-Japanese relations is covered, including 
American military interventions in Japan prior to World War II, along with the more 
recent history of strained relations due to incidents on Okinawa.  This section also 
provides an overview of operations by American military forces in Japan to contextualize 
the role Japan plays in America’s forward deployed presence in East Asia. 
2.2 History of United States Overseas Basing 
 
Conceptually, the structure of United States overseas basing evolved from the 
analytical framework of naval warfare as put forth by Alfred Thayer Mahan in a series of 
books and publications at the end of the 19th and start of the 20th century.  Mahan, a 
United States naval officer who eventually attained the rank of rear admiral (post-
retirement by an act of Congress), completed several in-depth studies of naval history and 
warfare and concluded that a strong national seapower was required in order for a state to 
become a major power on the world stage (Mahan, 1920, p. 284-290).  Viewing the vast 
technological improvements in ship design during his career, Mahan recognized that the 
development of steam powered warships highlighted “the Nation’s inability to coal and 
supply its own fleets” (Hart, 1965, p. 300) while deployed and this was due to the lack of 
overseas bases or coaling stations.  Additionally, he recognized that other major powers 
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had addressed these issues by creating “stations along the road, like the Cape of Good 
Hope, St. Helena, and Mauritius, not primarily for trade, but for defense and war; the 
demand for the possession of posts like Gibraltar, Malta, Louisburg, at the entrance of the 
Gulf of St. Laurence, posts whose value was chiefly strategic” (Mahan, 1920, p. 20).  The 
obvious gap therefore was extraterritorial support for American naval deployments.   
While Mahan’s theories spread throughout naval circles both within the United 
States and abroad, Halford MacKinder, a British geographer, published a serious of 
works concerning what he termed the heartland or geographical pivot (MacKinder, 
1943).  In these works, MacKinder argued that control over the vast resources of the 
Eurasian continent by one power would empower such a state so greatly that the entire 
world could be threatened by its expansion. Identifying this Eurasian heartland as modern 
day Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Mackinder believed that this region’s vast 
resources, population and, most importantly, protection from seaborne invasion thereby 
providing defense in depth, offered the nucleus or pivoting point for any expansion 
towards global domination.  The state that controlled these areas would be the pivot state 
in global power politics (MacKinder, 1943, p. 596-598).  Identifying the threat that the 
Soviet Union or an alliance of Asian states could pose by solely controlling this area, 
MacKinder argued for the continual balance of power and prevention of a land power 
becoming so powerful that it controlled the entire Eurasian continent (MacKinder, 1943). 
 The combination of these two geo-strategists’ theories results in two very basic, 
yet complex to manage, dictums for United States foreign policy.  First, the United States 
must balance its foreign relations and military engagement towards prevention of a 
hegemonic Eurasian land power similar to the actions of the United Kingdom from 17th 
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century to the start of World War II (Kissinger, 1994, p. 70-77, 826).  Doing so would 
prevent the capability of any one, or alliance, of states from dominating the heartland, 
expanding throughout the Eurasian continent, and utilizing the available resources to 
consolidate land power while developing sea power. 
Second, in order to prevent a hegemonic land power from attaining Eurasian 
continental supremacy, the United States must maintain naval forces on par, or 
exceeding, other great powers in the state system.  These naval forces must be available 
for deployment or combat action off or within, the Eurasian continent, thereby requiring 
considerable logistics and/or overseas bases from which to project American power.  
MacKinder himself recognized this and called Britain a “moated forward stronghold” 
(MacKinder, 1943, p. 301) from which the United States, itself a defense in depth for the 
Western Powers, could project air, land, and seapower onto the Eurasian continent’s 
western-most area.   
It is not perhaps a stretch therefore to see Japan, a state in similar geographical 
position to the United Kingdom, as the British twin off the Eurasian continent in the East.  
Finally, MacKinder, perhaps referencing the works of Mahan, states “seapower must in 
the final resort be amphibious if it is to balance land power” (MacKinder, 1943, p. 301-
302), viewed in the context of East Asia, the role of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force 
could not be clearer. 
The establishment and maintenance of overseas American military bases is not a 
new phenomenon, and has been a fixture of United States foreign policy for over 150 
years.  The current purpose and theoretical approach that defines their continued 
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functioning is less clear.  Advocates of isolationism see few benefits to far flung bases 
with long lines of communication and supply (Parent and MacDonald, 2011), yet a robust 
overseas basing structure endures within the United States military.  
In the context of United States bases in Japan, understanding the history and 
nature of the bases there will assist in building recommendations for the current 
realignment plan to ensure the geostrategic dictums of Mahan and MacKinder are still 
supported. 
2.3 United States – Japan relations before the 1951 Security Agreement 
During the 19th century the United States had expanded throughout much of what 
are today the territorial borders of the 50 states.  As the United States moved to develop 
commercial and military interests overseas, the need to support distant deployments of 
warships in support of these activities became apparent.  With the introduction of steam 
powered warships the need for coaling stations overseas became a top priority for United 
States military planners.  In the Pacific, with its immense distances between land masses 
necessitating the need for resupply ports, the United States had only recently begun to 
develop diplomatic relations (Hart, 1965, p. 18, 32-33, 54-55).  These challenges had 
been brought to the forefront in 1851-1852 during the deployment of the USS 
Susquehanna to her stationing as the command ship of the East India Squadron in China.  
The Susquehanna was forced to rely on other state’s hospitality and expensive coal 
resources during her journey from Norfolk to Hong Kong (Symonds, 2001, p. 72), 
presenting tactical and strategic challenges to future deployments of steam powered ships 
(Hart, 1965, p. 54-55).  Many believed that the lands of East Asia should be opened to the 
West to provide resupply, trade and diplomatic opportunities, whether those states 
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desired to be opened or not (Adams, 1842, p. 288-289).  Japan, which had long been 
closed to western influence in a self-imposed closure called Sakoku (Samuels, 2008, p. 
13), threatened death to trespassers or ship-wrecked sailors. The Tokugawa Shogunate, 
which ruled Japan since 1603, restricted western access to mainland Japan through 
Dejima, a small artificial island in the bay of Nagasaki, founded in 1641 and used 
primarily by the Dutch to trade with the Shogunate (McClain, 2002, p. 44-45).   
American ships, flagged as Dutch, had been using the port to trade.  However, 
attempts at true diplomatic or trading relations with the Shogunate failed, even after 
several attempts (1837, 1846 and 1849) to engage in discussions (Lawrence, 1953).  The 
last expedition in 1849 by Commander James P. Glynn, which secured the release of 
shipwrecked American sailors, had demonstrated the potential for success.  Upon his 
return to the United States, Commander Glynn recommended that future endeavors 
include more forceful demands for relations, particularly after seeing how horribly 
American prisoners were treated by the Japanese (McClain, 2002, p. 135).   
In 1852 Commodore Perry was named the new commander of the East India 
Squadron and charged with opening Japan.  The United States government ordered Perry 
to secure from the Tokugawa Shogunate “Japanese agreement to protect American 
seamen who were either ship-wrecked on Japan’s coast or driven into Japanese ports by 
bad weather; a similar agreement to allow the establishment of American coaling and 
supply stations at selected Japanese ports; and permission for U.S. vessels to enter one or 
more Japanese ports for trade” (Symonds, 2001, p. 74).  After arriving on station in 
Shanghai in 1853, Perry, with the East India Squadron, set out for Japan with three stops: 
the Ryukyu Islands or present day Okinawa, which had not yet been annexed by Japan, to 
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secure aid for any future shipwrecked American sailors, Chichi-Jima (known in Japan as 
part of the Ogasawara island group) to assess the small islands feasibility as a future 
coaling station for American warships, and finally Tokyo Bay to negotiate with the 
Tokugawa Shogunate for United States diplomatic and commercial interests.  
Commodore Perry was successful not only at each of these stops but also in the overall 
charge of opening Japan to American interests, protecting American sailors and 
establishing ports of entry with coaling stations (Navy Department Library, 1953; 
Symonds, 2001, p. 74; McClain, 2002, p. 138).  These concessions were signed on March 
31st 1854 and came to be known as the Treaty of Kanagawa, effectively opening Japan up 
to American, and later European, trade, diplomatic and regional ambitions (McClain, 
2002, p. 134-142). 
 Though the Treaty of Kanagawa was the first, many treaties were signed by Japan 
with the Western Powers in the coming years and the nature of these changed as access to 
Japan became more commonplace.  These treaties became more unequal, in both the 
commercial and diplomatic sense, as the Western Powers demanded ever greater access 
and Japan found itself in a progressively weaker negotiating position.  This period came 
to be known as the Bakumatsu, or End of the Curtain, as the Tokugawa Shogunate 
struggled to remain in power in the face of growing domestic opposition to western 
influence and a desire to restore the imperial family to power in place of the Shogunate.  
This movement became known as Sonnō-jōi or Revere the emperor, Expel the barbarians 
and was responsible for widespread outbreaks of violence against western citizens in the 
trading ports (McClain, 2002, p. 144, 146-148).  The Western Powers engaged in several 
small scale battles throughout Japan from 1863-1864 with the final Battle of Shimonoseki 
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in September 1864, representing the first failed opportunity for Japan to remove western 
forces from her shores.  Before the decade ended, Japan would experience its own civil 
war, pitting pro-imperial forces against the declining power of the Shogunate.   
Originally seeking to expel the barbarians, the pro-imperial party eventually 
shifted to one of modernization and negotiation with the West, including the United 
States.  The imperial party developed a national policy of Fukoku Kyōhei or Rich 
country, strong army (Samuels, 2008, p. 15).  The ultimate victors of the Civil War, the 
pro-imperial faction established the Meiji Emperor as the sole sovereign of the state in 
what came to be called the Meiji Restoration.   
Considered by McClain (2002) as the beginning of the modern period of Japan, 
the Meiji Restoration in 1868 marked the shift of Japan from a feudal society to one 
driven to modernize with western technology through commercial and military 
enterprises (McClain, 2002, p. 155-171).  Additionally, the re-established emperor 
worked to re-negotiate the unequal treaties imposed upon Japan by the Western Powers 
while simultaneously rapidly importing and developing a domestic military base on par 
with most of the great Western Powers.   
For the remainder of the 19th century, American and Japanese interests would run 
parallel with the United States solidifying itself as a Pacific power through military 
victories in the Philippines, as well as the annexation of Hawaii (Mahan, 1900, p. 7-12).  
During the same period Japan rapidly modernized its military capabilities and tested them 
against other regional states such as China and Korea (McClain, 2002, p. 295-300).  
American military units forward deployed to East Asia were supported by coaling and 
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repair installations throughout the newly acquired territories following the Spanish-
American War in 1898 (Hart, 1965, p. 32-33) as the United States continued to establish 
itself as an Asian power through the use of trade, diplomacy and shows of force such as 
the Great White Fleet in 1907-1909 (Hart, 1965).   
Relations continued amicably between the United States and Japan and in 1908 
they signed the Root-Takahira Agreement which required that Japan recognize American 
sovereignty in the Philippines and that the United States recognize Japanese interests on 
the Korean Peninsula.  Though tensions sometimes were ratcheted up as these two 
powers jockeyed for position in East Asia (Hart, 1965, p. 204-236), relations between the 
United States and Japan would remain relatively stable until the 1930s with the 
aggressive expansion of Japanese military interests on the Asian mainland. 
 This expansion of Japanese imperial power in the 1930s would be the catalyst for 
American involvement in the Second World War in the Pacific.  The Pacific theater 
pitted Japanese imperial forces against an American led allied coalition that, after four 
years of island hopping, resulted in the unconditional surrender of imperial Japan in 
1945.   
 At the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945, the United States found 
itself in control of vast expanses of territory in Europe and the Pacific that had recently 
been under the dominion of the Axis Powers: Germany, Italy and Japan.  The 
demarcation of state borders in both theaters of conflict contained inherent problems that 
provided challenges to clear, effective post-war occupation.   
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In Europe, Allied forces struggled, diplomatically, to re-draw borders and develop 
clear guidelines on occupation zones (Kissinger, 1994, p. 417).  This was a particularly 
challenging task while Soviet forces continued to occupy large portions of Eastern 
Europe.  In the Pacific, where the United States had shouldered a majority of the Allied 
war burden, distribution of the Japanese Empire fell to officials of the War and State 
departments. 
Formosa, or Taiwan, was returned to China, the Philippines, which had largely 
been liberated by allied forces, were returned to the United States, and British territories 
throughout Asia returned to British control.  The remaining territories of the Japanese 
Empire, principally those that were considered part of Japan rather than colonies of the 
Empire (Korea, Manchukuo, Sakhalin, the Ryukyu Islands, the main islands of Japan and 
the Kurils) were coveted by the Allied powers for both their strategic and economic 
potential. 
Soviet demands for an occupation zone within the main islands of Japan met 
fierce resistance within the War and State departments and rather than provide the Soviet 
Union with a toehold on the main islands, the United States instead offered the northern 
half of the newly split Korea to the Soviet Union along with Japanese territory on 
Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to which Stalin, more concerned with events in the 
European theater, acquiesced. 
The result was a Japan vastly different, both geographically and politically, than 
one that had existed before the war.  Gone were the vast continental territories with their 
resources and the infrastructure to extract them.  The Empire of Japan, which at its height 
  
14 
 
encompassed almost 2.9 million square miles of territory along with vast expanses of the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans, was reduced to controlling only the four main islands of 
Japan:  Honshu, Kyushu, Hokkaido and Shikoku.  Here, United States occupation forces 
established bases to ensure the peaceful transition of Japan from a martial imperial state 
to a democratic and capitalist one.   
In a repeat of history, over 90 years after Commodore Matthew Perry’s initial 
opening, the United States once again forcefully entered Japan encouraging open 
government and free trade (McClain, 2002, p. 523-524).  Unsurprisingly, Japan, again, 
learned and mastered the rules of the game swiftly by rebuilding and becoming a global 
economic power in less than 20 years.  This recovery, dubbed an economic miracle 
(McClain, 2002, p. 562-563, 571-582), was supported by United States investment and 
trade, particularly following the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, and the 
continuing presence of United States military forces on the islands in support of the 
newly established security treaty between the United States and Japan in 1951.   
This treaty was essentially a part of the San Francisco Treaty, detailing the full 
closure of the Pacific theatre of World War II, and reflective of the dramatic shift that 
Japanese national policy had experienced following the end of the Second World War 
(McClain, 2002, p. 555-558).  United States military forces would maintain bases within 
the main islands of Japan while the Ryukyu Islands or Okinawa was given to the United 
States as a military colony.  Sacrificed once at the end of World War II to buy the main 
islands of Japan time, the relinquishment of the prefecture to the United States was a 
convenient way for Japan to ignore another troubled part of its past.  Domestically, the 
imperial national policy of Fukoku Kyōhei, or Rich country, Strong army, was thrown out 
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with the signing of unconditional surrender onboard the USS Missouri on September 9th 
1945.  In its stead, a policy had been developed that built upon the new Japanese 
constitution, which outlawed war, military forces, and incorporated the long term goals of 
one government official: Shigeru Yoshida.  
2.4 The Cold War Treaty Era: 1950-1996 
Elected as the last Prime Minister of the Empire of Japan, Shigeru Yoshida 
believed that Japan’s future lay in close concert with those of the West, particularly the 
United States and United Kingdom, and he worked to secure Japan’s economic future 
while essentially relinquishing Japan’s foreign and military policy to the United States 
(McClain, 2002, p. 555-558).  The new constitution, created by American occupation 
authorities and accepted by the Japanese government, included a clause on the 
renunciation of war of which Yoshida took full advantage.  This clause, Article 9 of the 
constitution, allowed only the maintenance of a self-defense force to act as a response 
force to domestic crisis or minor threats to Japanese territorial integrity.  The true 
protection of Japan from external threats would come from the permanent stationing of 
United States military units throughout Japan in support of the newly signed security 
agreement.   
By agreeing to these limits on Japanese military power, Yoshida met objectives 
not otherwise attainable in the post-war atmosphere of political debate (McClain, 2002, p. 
555-558).  Perhaps most important, Yoshida was able to solidify power and prevent a 
resurgence of militarism or revisionist political parties that wished to make Japan a 
“normal nation” again through rearmament (Samuels, 2008, p. 32).  By doing so the 
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liberal internationalists, of whom Yoshida was one, were able to focus government 
spending on economic revival rather than rearmament and military procurement.   
Though the country had been devastated by over 14 years of warfare, Yoshida 
understood the economic potential Japan maintained, if it could avoid entanglements in 
military affairs.  To accomplish this, during his first of three terms in office as Prime 
Minister, Yoshida worked with occupation authorities to build an “unequal alliance with 
the United States and [to use] it as a shield behind which [Japan] could regenerate 
prosperity” (Samuels, 2008, p. 32).  By doing so, Samuels states that “the only dangers to 
Japanese prosperity and security were abandonment by the United States or entanglement 
in U.S. Wars” (Samuels, 2008, p. 32) for which Yoshida, and subsequent prime ministers, 
pointed to the pacifist constitution and Article 9 which prevented Japan from becoming 
involved in such entanglements.  This policy, of free riding under the American security 
umbrella, supporting American military bases within Japan, and preventing large defense 
expenditures, became known as the Yoshida Doctrine.  Domestically, the politics of the 
Yoshida Doctrine were not accepted by all and opponents of Yoshida, namely Kishi 
Nobusuke’s anti-mainstream conservatives, worked to remove United States military 
forces from Japan and develop domestic military capability.  This challenge came to a 
head in 1960 with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between 
the United States and Japan, a revision of the 1951 security treaty, when Nobuske’s 
opponents of the Yoshida Doctrine attempted to attain more autonomy for Japan with the 
eventual removal of United States military forces (Samuels, 2008, p. 42-43).  Instead, this 
1960 treaty expanded the integration of United States and Japanese forces, codified a 
status of forces agreement for the stationing of United States military forces in Japan, and 
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empowered the Japanese Self Defense Force to participate in collective security of the 
main islands of Japan.  Frequently a point of contention between the United States and 
Japan, this policy has facilitated the establishment of a network of American military 
bases in Japan and the growth of the Japanese economy into one of the world’s largest 
(3rd as of 2012) (International Monetary Fund, 2011a).    
Externally, the Yoshida Doctrine was tested first during the outbreak of hostilities 
on the Korean Peninsula in 1950.  United States military units stationed on occupation 
duty in Japan were the closest allied forces available to come to the aid of the newly 
formed South Korea.  On the main islands of Japan, the newly formed civil police force 
was transformed overnight into an unofficial military force, the precursor of the Japanese 
Self Defense Force.  The major changes though developed on Okinawa, the new military 
colony of the United States in East Asia.  In support of combat operations on the Korean 
Peninsula, military facilities on Okinawa were rapidly developed and used as staging 
points for troop rotations and bombing raids.  The United States military mobilization on 
Okinawa was a direct result of the United States belief that the loss of Korea to the 
communists would further endanger Japan.  The need therefore to contain the spread of 
communism and push back the North Korean advance required a sovereign, fully 
militarized location in the Pacific, unconstrained even by the welcoming nature of the 
Yoshida Doctrine.  Many therefore recognize the United States involvement in Korea, 
and the subsequent military development of Okinawa, as the evolution of Kennan’s 
defense of “strong points” into the implementation of NSC-68, the policy of containment 
(Gaddis, 2005, p. 89).  The new policy of containment, as first outlined by the Truman 
administration and evolved by subsequent presidential administrations, stated that: “any 
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substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise 
the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength 
could be assembled” and “the assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and in the 
context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a 
defeat everywhere (Gaddis, 2005, p. 89).”  The implementation of George Kennan’s 
theory of containment, the belief that the spread of communism must be contained to 
prevent it from encroaching upon those areas the United States believed to be crucial to 
its own security, was the use of American military forces from Japan in the Korean War 
(Gaddis, 2005, p. ix).  President Truman said as much during his address at the outbreak 
of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula stating: 
Communism was acting in Korea, just as Hitler, Mussolini and the 
Japanese had ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if 
South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened 
to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were 
permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition 
from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist 
threat and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors (Truman, 1956, p. 
335). 
This view, that the loss of South Korea to North Korean forces would threaten free 
institutions, and particularly Japan, directly led to United States intervention on the 
Korean Peninsula and the military buildup on Okinawa.  Furthermore it can be argued 
that: 
The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led 
directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... The essential point... 
is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from 
considerations of US policy toward Japan (Kim, 1973, p. 46).   
Led by General Douglas MacArthur, appointed as commander of the United 
Nations Command in South Korea, United States military forces on occupation duty in 
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Japan acted as a quick response force swiftly deploying to areas in South Korea to stem 
the advance of North Korean troops until additional units could arrive from the 
continental United States through the bases on Okinawa.  This role of an expeditionary 
quick response force has come to define some, if not a majority, of the stationing of 
United States military forces in Japan.  In a recent book discussing the new American 
maritime strategy for the 21st century, Geoffrey Till, a British naval historian at Kings 
College London states: 
 …specific mention is made of the more post-modern benefits of forward 
deployed expeditionary capabilities, particular[ly] their capacity to 
contribute to homeland defense in depth, their advantages in fostering and 
sustaining cooperative relationship with other nations and, most 
significantly, their ability to ‘prevent or contain local disruptions before 
they impact the global system’ (Till, 2011, p. 338). 
Though Till goes on to discuss how expeditionary operations against Iraq and 
Afghanistan fall into this category, this discussion can easily be prescribed to United 
States expeditionary forces currently stationed in Japan. 
 Not addressed by Till is the impact on the local populations in foreign countries 
that serve as host to these forces.  On Okinawa, where the 3rd Marine Expeditionary 
Force is stationed, deep emotions on the role of military forces in civilian communities, 
developed in World War II and exacerbated by the military development of Okinawa 
during the Korean War, create pacifist or anti-militaristic sentiment.  During the post-
World War II period of 1950-1972 Okinawa served as the keystone of the Pacific for 
United States military forces operating throughout East Asia including Korea and 
Vietnam.  Okinawans, not wholly American citizens and never truly Japanese, struggled 
to identify with a national character from either state, particularly challenging as they 
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hosted a majority of United States military forces in Japan.  The reversion of Okinawa to 
Japanese sovereignty in 1972 altered the minutia of daily life, such as which side of the 
road vehicles drove on, yet the unequal usage of Okinawa as the host to a majority of 
United States forces in Japan continued as did Tokyo’s failure to address the complicated 
history of the imperial period.  Throughout the balance of the Cold War Okinawa would 
continue to serve as the staging ground for United States military deployments in East 
Asia, particularly as the Pacific hedge against Soviet regional aggression.  Figure 2.1 
depicts the present, continued unequal structure of United States military forces in Japan. 
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Figure 2.1 Major bases of United States Forces Japan in terms of personnel and 
equipment.  Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Basing 
Data Source: Department of Defense (2011). 
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2.5 Challenges to the Alliance: 1996 - Present 
 
Japanese domestic politics remained relatively stable throughout the Cold War 
with liberal internationalists supporting the Yoshida Doctrine through the limitation of 
the Japanese Self Defense Forces in favor of the United States security umbrella.  As the 
Cold War came to a close these policies began to shift in the direction of a more focused 
domestic discussion on defense capabilities and normal nation status.  In 1996, five years 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan met again to 
officially renew the security alliance.  Japanese politicians, keen on improving the 
capabilities of the Japanese Self Defense Force and gaining closer equality in the alliance, 
agreed to new cooperative guidelines that expanded the role of Japanese forces.  For the 
first time since World War II, Japanese forces would be permitted to engage in combat, 
officially defend the country, and engage in regional security operations.  These changes, 
though minor, redefined the security relationship by supporting incremental re-
militarization of Japanese international policy including the deployment of troops and 
ships to the Middle East during the Iraq War (Samuels, 2008, p. 92-97).  This 
modernization of the relationship and capabilities of the Japanese Self Defense Force 
skirted the limitations imposed by the Japanese constitution and facilitated discussions on 
mission expansion and regional deterrence.  The core tenants of the Yoshida Doctrine 
became more flexible as Japanese Self Defense Forces were given humanitarian and 
peace keeping missions around the world.  Normal nationalists, those that wished for 
Japan to become a normal nation again by maintaining a true military, were testing the 
boundaries of acceptable roles for the Self Defense Forces (Samuels, 2008, p. 91-98). 
 
  
23 
 
In 2006 the Japanese Defense Agency became the Ministry of Defense, a full 
cabinet level department of the Japanese government (Samuels, 2008, p. 75).  The slow 
yet steady military modernization of the Japanese military continues.  Perhaps most 
disconcerting is the historical troubled apologies of Japan.  Japan’s imperial past contains 
some of the most vicious war crimes committed on the planet, all against its regional 
neighbors, and all mostly un-acknowledged by Japan.  The visit by Japanese prime 
ministers to the famous Yasukuni war shrine is perhaps the most obvious example of 
Japan’s unwillingness to acknowledge its imperial past yet other, less publicized, issues 
remain.  The textbooks of Japanese schools fail to give globally acceptable accounts of 
the imperial period and frequently skip crucial facts such as the Nanking Massacre, 
further alienating and inflaming the populations of regional neighbors that had 
experienced these horrible events (Samuels, 2008, pg. 113-115). 
Perhaps the final complication to the United States-Japanese relationship is the 
lack of a post-Cold War mission statement for United States Forces Japan.  The lack of a 
direct threat to Japanese territorial integrity, in the form of the Soviet Union, has put the 
mission of United States forces in Japan adrift.  Okinawa, reverted to Japanese control in 
1972 in exchange for a Japanese commitment to regional defense (Samuels, 2008, p. 43), 
continued to bear the brunt of the United States basing burden without a clear need for 
such forces to exist.  Interestingly, other regional United States commands maintained 
clear guidelines on the mission and commanders intent.  In Korea, the United States 
Forces Korea command maintained the mission of “deter, defend, and defeat external 
aggression” (United States Forces Korea, 2012) with its primary opponent, North Korea, 
which had maintained power.  Fixated for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, USFK 
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had no need for a mission shift.  United States Pacific Command, the parent command of 
both USFJ and USFK, maintained the same expected broad based mission of:   
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), together with other U.S. 
Government agencies, protects and defends the United States, its 
territories, Allies, and interests; alongside Allies and partners, promotes 
regional security and deters aggression; and, if deterrence fails, is prepared 
to respond to the full spectrum of military contingencies to restore Asia-
Pacific stability and security (United States Pacific Command, 2010) 
Interestingly, the strategic guidance for USPACOM addresses specific concerns in the 
Asia-Pacific region such as the Korean Peninsula, the United States-China and United 
States-India relationship yet no mention is made of Japan or United States Forces Japan 
(United States Pacific Command, 2010).  This oversight speaks directly to the lack of 
mission for United States military forces in Japan and complicates the relationship 
between the United States and Japan.  As Japanese domestic politics moves towards a 
stance of acceptable re-militarization the United States must either work to co-opt these 
forces into joint ventures or work to prevent full scale militarization of Japan, particularly 
as other regional states become ever more concerned with Japan’s intentions.  These 
factors, of the remilitarization of Japan, a lack of mission for United States Forces Japan, 
and unresolved imperial histories come to the forefront in discussions on United States 
military bases on Okinawa.  Here, the protests against basing and remilitarization 
comingle with the troubled past of Okinawa’s sacrifice by Tokyo in World War II and 
then its sacrifice in the aftermath, as an American military colony.  Understanding 
military realignments and their effect on Okinawa is crucial to contextualizing the 
complications of United States military forces in Japan and the purpose for their 
presence. 
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2.6 Base Realignments and Okinawa  
 
The post-Cold War basing structure of United States military units underwent 
critical examinations and realignments following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991.  The success of the containment strategy caught the Department of Defense by 
surprise and presented challenges to the existing base structure, the purpose of which had 
been to defend against Soviet aggression (Gaddis, 2005, p. 59).  As the realities of the 
uni-polar global security environment became apparent, calls for base closures and 
realignments became a more frequent aspect of United States politics with commissions 
created five times, post-Soviet collapse, to analyze United States military posture and 
suggest changes (Department of Defense, 2005a). 
These commissions, called Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC), have done 
much to focus public discussions on the 21st century needs and geo-strategic 
requirements of United States military and foreign policies.  Unfortunately, the remaining 
Cold War basing structure contains anomalies that cause friction with some United States 
overseas partners.  These partners, which are commonly part of a larger security 
framework, provide land, financial support and in many cases, joint training with 
American military units based in their country.  The friction caused by this Cold War era 
military basing structure provides ammunition for anti-American sentiment in these 
countries and deters the growth and development of closer ties between the United States 
and these security partners (Otis, 2009; Koo, 2011).  One such example is the bilateral 
security agreement between the United States and Japan with the stationing of over thirty 
thousand American military personnel throughout the Japanese islands.  Over 74% of 
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these personnel are based on the island of Okinawa, the southernmost prefecture of 
Japan.   
Okinawa, the smallest prefecture of Japan, has been host to a majority of the 
American ground combat troops, with their attached support and transportation units such 
as helicopters and transport planes, for a majority of the post-war period.  This basing has 
developed friction both on the island, between United States military units, the 
Okinawans, and with the federal government in Tokyo.  The friction is due, in large part, 
to several high profile crimes by United States military personnel that victimized local 
Okinawan civilians.  This put strain on the United States-Japan security agreements and 
led some to question the presence of such a large foreign military contingent on the small 
island (Johnson, 2004).  Compounding this is the growth of commercial and residential 
developments around the bases that has led to complaints of noise pollution from military 
aircraft (Bandow, 1998).  These challenges ultimately stem from the political and civilian 
pressures of basing large units of foreign military personal on a small, relatively closed, 
island economy and environment such as Okinawa.   
Recent dialogue between the United States and Japan has been to address some of 
the more salient issues such as noise pollution, base proximity to residential housing 
sectors, and concerns with the threat of crime.  The result of this dialogue has been 
several plans to relocate some United States military units to a more remote part of 
Okinawa and other units to the United States territory of Guam (Fogarty, 2010; Kan, 
2012).  This dialogue, though positive in its attempt to finally address issues brought 
forth by the people of Okinawa for decades, fails to take into account the environmental 
and planning complications of moving these military units and also the effect they would 
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have not only on their new home locations but on American geostrategic interests in the 
region.   
The Overseas Basing Commission, formed in 2002 to assess the potential closure 
and realignment of United States overseas bases, found significant faults with existing 
plans for realignments, including the realignment of forces on Okinawa.  Their 
assessment of the existing methodology for base realignments overseas was very critical 
stating that: 
The Commission must emphasize that considerations of rebasing cannot 
be seen as an aside from … major strategic deliberations.  It cannot be 
merely a consequence of domestic political tradeoffs.  Nor can it be the 
fallout of diplomatic compromise, the appeasement of an ally here, a quid 
pro quo for a bilateral arrangement there.  The entire basing structure of 
the United States, both domestic and international, must be an integrated 
whole and must relate directly to the national security strategy of the 
United States (Emphasis added) (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 
6). 
 
 Furthermore, the plans developed have not taken into consideration how “our 
presence in Okinawa is related to our commitments to Japan, Korea, the Taiwan Straits 
and other locations in East Asia” (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 14) and that 
“Okinawa is the strategic linchpin to operational capabilities in East Asia.  Diminishing 
our combat capability on the island would pose great risk to our national interests in the 
region” (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. C&R2).   
The Commission identified several deficiencies with the existing base restructure 
on Okinawa that were seemingly ignored and recommended that policy makers consider 
alternate options.  One example was delaying any planned moves until the 2005 BRAC 
report had been finalized.  This report, though it dealt specifically with domestic force 
posturing of United States military forces, could provide guidelines for realignments 
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outside the United States.  Consequently, discussions on base realignments for Okinawa 
were delayed, in the hopes that clearer guidance could be obtained from the release of the 
2005 BRAC report. 
Base Realignments and Closure 
 
The United States government has gone through five iterations of base closures 
and realignments since the closing days of the Cold War.  Starting in 1988, the 
Department of Defense created a process to examine its current and future military basing 
requirements in light of budget cuts, a desire for increased efficiency and a general 
thawing of relations with the Soviet Union (BRAC Commission, 1988, p. 8-11).  These 
BRACs made recommendations to Congress and the President to disband or move 
existing military bases and ensure the local base economy and environment would be 
supported following the removal of the base. 
Though each round of BRACs caused considerable debate, primarily from 
legislators trying to keep bases in their state for local financial reasons (Spencer, 2005, p. 
6), they all concluded with major shifts in US military basing, both domestic and 
overseas.  The latest BRAC concluded in 2005 resulted in the closure of over 180 
military facilities and the realignment of over 133,000 service members (Department of 
Defense, 2005b).  Throughout these procedures, officials have worked to develop clear 
guidelines and recommendations for future BRACs or other Department of Defense 
installation movements.  One key point made during the first round in 1988 was the role 
urban development has had on bases.  The first commission stated: 
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The Commission found that many bases have experience[d] an erosion of 
their military value as a result of urban development.  The resulting 
encroachment has forced the modification of missions at many 
installations.  The acquisition of additional land, especially in less 
populated area[s], may be needed to satisfy military requirements (BRAC 
Commission, 1988, p. 7). 
Policy planners have since attempted to mitigate the effect bases have had on the 
surrounding population and limit the number of bases developed or maintained within 
urban areas.  On Okinawa, this problem has yet to be resolved and speaks to the clear 
disjunction between prior BRACs and the on-going controversy over United States 
military bases on Okinawa.  The continued usage of military bases in densely populated 
and developed urban areas on Okinawa has facilitated the anti-American sentiment 
prevalent by native Okinawans due to both the negative effects on continued 
development, along with other quality of life factors such as noise pollution and increased 
crime.  Current American military bases on Okinawa take up 20% of the land area and 
constitute large portions of the major cities and towns including 82.8% of Ginowan, the 
location of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma.  In this city the population 
density, due to American military ownership of a majority of the city land, is 4,853 /km2 
(Japanese Statistics Bureau, 2011)1.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The Japanese Statistics Bureau does not release population densities for units below the 
prefecture level.  This population density was calculated based on the Japanese Statistics 
Bureau census for Ginowan and publicly available information on the size of the town of 
Ginowan. 
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Figure 2.2 Land use by United States Forces Japan by acreage.  Okinawa, the 
smallest prefecture, contains the highest density of United States military forces 
of all prefectures.  Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). 
Basing Data Source: Department of Defense (2011). 
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These population densities are higher than the city of Chicago yet have drastically 
different cityscapes due to building height restrictions imposed by the American military 
ownership of Okinawan airspace (Global Security, 2011).  Compounding the challenge of 
high population densities is the result of urban development around the military base 
without adequate planning oversight.  Due to the nature of military bases requiring high 
levels of security, no road, utility, sewer, or connection of any sort passes through these 
military bases, creating logistical and urban planning challenges for these cities.  
Additionally, the unplanned development of housing and businesses around the bases has 
created patchwork networks of partially paved roads and pathways throughout seemingly 
developed areas.  These challenges have further hindered the Okinawans ability to 
improve their economy and create a stable environment for its citizens.  The result is the 
prefecture with the lowest per capita income in Japan and the highest level of 
unemployment 2 , due primarily to the seasonal nature of Okinawa's largest industry, 
tourism (Government of Japan, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Okinawan per capita income has steadily maintained at about 70% of the equivalent of 
the main islands of Japan.  
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Figure 2.3 Population densities of Japanese prefectures.  Though not as dense as 
other major metropolitan areas, Okinawa’s disproportionate share of military 
bases creates planning complications that do not exist in any other prefecture.  
Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012).  Population Data 
Source: Japanese Statistics Bureau (2011). 
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Perhaps the final issue that has pushed the Okinawan base issue to the forefront of 
the current discourse on the United States-Japan security agreement was the 1995 rape of 
a twelve year old school girl by three American service members.  This incident, one of 
several high-profile crimes committed by Americans against Okinawan civilians, 
understandably inflamed the civilian population and led to questions about the role these 
bases have in the modern, post-Cold-War era.  Following this incident, discussions 
between the governments of Japan and the United States were opened to find an 
alternative option for several of the American bases on Okinawa (McCurry, 2008).  For 
the following decade these discussions continued with varying levels of support from the 
federal governments in Tokyo and Washington yet unwavering resolve continued on the 
part of the Okinawans.   
In 2005, after a decade of discussions on a base transfer and the conclusion of the 
American BRAC, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed that the current 
restriction on development and the hardships placed on the Okinawans demanded the 
removal or realignment of several American military units on the island.  The result was 
not an official United States Department of Defense-wide base realignment and closure 
plan but rather a specific set of moves that would alter the stationing and base structure of 
United States military units in Okinawa. 
The Okinawan BRAC 
 
 The decision to move portions of the United States military stationed on Okinawa 
came in 2005 after ten years of negotiations and deliberation by the governments of the 
United States and Japan (Yoshikazu, 2006).  The plan, set forth and agreed upon by both 
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governments, is comprised of two primary sections.  The first would see over 8,000 
United States Marines, part of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, and their dependents 
moved from Okinawa to Guam, a United States dependency over 2,300 kilometers to the 
east.  The second portion of the move would be a realignment of MCAS Futenma to a 
new base offshore of the Henoko Peninsula near Nago, Okinawa.  It is this second move, 
and the proposition of land reclamation off the Henoko Peninsula, that has caused 
massive protests and increased anti-American sentiment on Okinawa over the past 
several years (Fogarty, 2010).   
Citing the development failure of the current bases on Okinawa, the United States 
government believed that any new base constructed on the island itself would eventually 
become surrounded by urban development, similar to MCAS Futenma, and put the 
governments in a similar situation in the future.  The decision to instead reclaim land 
offshore of the Henoko Peninsula, currently occupied by the United States Marine Corps 
base Camp Schwabb, was deemed the most appropriate to prevent future development 
and military operational challenges (Economist, 2005).  Unfortunately, the chosen 
location of the water and reefs off the Henoko Peninsula, are domestically-protected sites 
and home to several species of threatened species including the dugoung (a relative of the 
manatee) and one protected species of sea turtles.  The proposed base would reclaim land 
currently composed of coral reefs, a pristine ocean bay and the habitats of these protected 
animals. 
 The people of Okinawa, already unhappy with the military basing arrangement in 
the densely urban areas, have continued to protest, with the added feature of also 
demanding that the base be moved completely away, off the island of Okinawa.  Since 
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the Japanese public became aware of this plan, protests and around-the-clock occupations 
by civilians in the proposed site have occurred (Yoshikazu, 2006).  Perhaps the most 
unfortunate aspect of this plan is the failure on the part of the governments of Japan and 
the United States to consider alternate options, either on Okinawa or elsewhere in the 
Pacific.  Members of the United States Congress have recommended combining the 
planned capabilities of the Henoko Base with Kadena Air Base in Chatan, one of the 
most highly populated cities, or on one of the main islands of Japan (Overseas Basing 
Commission, 2005, p. C&R4; Dickie, 2011).  Neither option has been seriously 
considered, nor, until 2011, have any alternate options been proposed to prevent the 
construction of a new base off the Henoko Peninsula. 
Environmental ramifications  
 
 This failure to consider alternate locations that have less of an impact on the 
environment and civilian quality of life represents potentially poor consideration and long 
term planning on the part of both governments.  Anti-American sentiment on Okinawa, 
and throughout Japan, has steadily increased since the 1995 rape incident and has only 
gained ground since the proposal for the Henoko Base land reclamation project.  The 
concept of environmental consideration in the construction of new military bases is not 
new to the United States, and in fact previous BRACs have made environmental concerns 
an important factor in base construction.  In the Base Redevelopment and Realignment 
Manual published in 2006, under Complying with Laws that Protect Natural and Cultural 
Resources, the Department of Defense states: 
As part of the NEPA analysis, the Military Department will analyze the 
impacts on natural and cultural resources... Additionally and aside from 
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the NEPA requirements, other laws such as the Endangered Species Act 
and National Historic Preservation Act require the Military Department to 
analyze the impacts on natural and cultural resources and to consult with 
Federal and State agencies before making final property disposal decisions 
(Emphasis added) (Grone, 2006). 
 Yet planners have failed to take the local (prefecture) considerations into effect 
and have failed to complete an adequate environmental impact report on the construction 
of the new base.  Moreover, attempts by the United States Department of Defense to 
claim it is not responsible for actions committed by the Government of Japan on Okinawa 
have failed.  In the Dugong v. Gates (2008) lawsuit which contested the United States 
Department of Defense claim of “no responsibility” in the construction of the Henoko 
base, the United States Federal District Court of Northern California found in favor of the 
plaintiffs and ruled that the United States Department of Defense had a responsibility and 
requirement to complete an independent Environmental Assessment Report of the 
planned base prior to any construction (Dugong v. Gates, 2008; Tanji, 2008).   
Though the Department of Defense will complete the assessment, the impact it 
will have on the actual base construction is unknown as policy planners continue to speak 
in terms that make the base construction all but assured.  At a recent presentation in 
Washington D.C., the Japanese politician Ishihara Nobuteru (the current Secretary-
General of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, historically the most powerful party in 
Japan), whom many view as the next Prime Minister of Japan, stated that the question of 
the Henoko base transfer is of little importance to the larger vision that is the United 
States-Japan security agreement and that the base construction should continue regardless 
of any protest by the Okinawans (Ishihara, 2011, p. 4-5).  This viewpoint, propagated by 
one of the most senior politicians in Japan, is directly against the civilian wishes of 
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Okinawa and fails to take a long-term view of the negative consequences this realignment 
could have on anti-American sentiment and the overall relationship between the United 
States and Japan. 
2.7 American Protests of Overseas Basing 
 
Discussions on overseas basing are not always positive and critics frequently cite 
the United States’ global structure of bases as an example of American imperialism 
resulting in calls for the partial or full withdrawal of United States forces overseas.  
Perhaps the most well-known is Chalmers Johnson, a retired professor from the 
University of California, San Diego and President of the Japan Policy Research Institute.  
Johnson, in several books entitled the Blowback Series, argues that American imperial 
overstretch has negatively affected not only the American economy, but also our relations 
with the states hosting our bases (Johnson, 2005, p. 310-312).  Stating that “the only truly 
common elements in the totality of America’s foreign bases are imperialism and 
militarism – an impulse on the part of our elites to dominate other peoples largely 
because we have the power to do so” (Johnson, 2005, p. 152), Johnson puts forth an 
argument that since the end of the Cold War the United States has conjured up false 
enemies, including the potential resurgence of Japan itself, in order to maintain overseas 
bases and offensive operations in weak states (Johnson, 2005, p. 57-64).   
Johnson unabashedly attacks the use of American military bases in Japan as an 
occupation force rather than one of peaceful cooperation (Johnson, 2004, p. 36-38).  
Glossing over the frequently tense security environment in East Asia, Johnson states that 
“the Japanese public does not … believe that their country is threatened by China” and 
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that “public opinion in Japan … remains deeply suspicious of American claims that 
North Korea is a threat” (Johnson, 2004, p. 58-59).  His original work was published in 
2004, before a rise in pro-base sentiment by Japanese due to the 2006 North Korean 
missile tests and the testing of a nuclear device.  Johnson’s more recent book in 2007, 
Nemesis, merely modified his commentary on Japanese perceptions of American military 
forces by saying “they like being protected by the United States against possible threats 
from China and North Korea, but they do not like having foreign troops living anywhere 
near them” (Johnson, 2007, p. 205).  This critique seems focused on Okinawa and fails to 
present data on public perceptions of bases on the main islands of Japan.   
Discussing Okinawa, Johnson states that “the government in Tokyo likes [75% of 
US forces stationed on Okinawa] this arrangement because it knows that the public will 
tolerate American troops on Japanese soil only if they are kept out of sight” (Johnson, 
2005, p. 200).  Yet on the next page, he discusses the many United States bases 
throughout the main islands of Japan with no serious discussion of public opinion.  
Though correct in his assessment of the anti-basing sentiment prevalent on Okinawa, 
Johnson does not adequately assess the complete picture of perceptions by the Japanese 
public on American military bases in Japan.  Nor does he offer arguments valid to 
remove the bases in their entirety.  Furthermore, recent polling of the Japanese public 
shows increases in public support for the American military presence directly 
contradicting Johnson’s viewpoints (Foster, 2011).  Though Johnson highlights much of 
the injustice perpetrated by the United States and the Government of Japan against the 
Okinawans he ultimately fails to present a clear, well thought-out plan that addresses the 
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needs of Japanese civilians, the security environment in East Asia or American foreign 
policy objectives. 
In a more recent piece in Foreign Affairs against the forward defense of the 
United States, Parent and MacDonald (2011) argue that reducing the presence of overseas 
bases could serve as a booster to a struggling American economy, through cost savings, 
and not affect military capabilities or create regional instability.  Parent and MacDonald 
state “forward defense is a holdover from the Cold War” and that should a conflict erupt, 
“U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure 
the option of quick U.S. intervention” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 37-38).   
Though laudable for their desire to reduce government spending, Parent and 
MacDonald ultimately fail to account for many intricacies in their broad statements 
concerning overseas bases.  First among these is the Omoiyari Yosan, or sympathy 
budget, given by the Government of Japan to cover expenses for United States military 
forces in Japan.  Parent and MacDonald fail to mention or examine the more than 4.4 
billion USD that Japan spends yearly to support United States military forces in Japan.  
This amount covered 75-% of the costs of United States Forces Japan in 2003 (the most 
recent report) and represents the largest subsidy of any state with a United States overseas 
base (Department of Defense, 2004, p. B-21).  Viewed another way, Japan’s sympathy 
budget in support of United States military forces in Japan equated to more than half of 
all cost-sharing programs by foreign countries in support of United States overseas bases 
(Department of Defense, 2004, p. E-4).   
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Another problem with Parent and MacDonald’s desire to realign or close United 
States overseas bases is their belief that “U.S. allies … will act as a natural early warning 
system and a first line of defense, as well as provide logistical hubs and financial support 
for any necessary U.S. responses” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 42).  Yet this fails to 
account for the intricate relationships that exist in East Asia.  For instance, challenging 
political questions such as the usage of Japanese ports as logistical hubs in the event of 
hostilities in the Taiwan Straits are neither addressed nor mentioned.  Nor are 
contingencies relating to the Korean Peninsula, where it would be possible to envision 
North Korea threatening nuclear or conventional retaliation at Japan if it were to support 
American forces coming to the aide of South Korea, discussed in any context beyond the 
need for “rapid response forces” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 43).  These factors 
have been shown to stress the security relationship between the United States and Japan 
and they must be accounted for rather than assuming that our allies will always do what is 
expected (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 20).   
Additionally, Parent and MacDonald do not address the logistical challenges 
posed for first responding units, in their plan stationed in Hawaii or on the continental 
United States, and responding to a crisis in East Asia.  They only comment that 
“outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared 
to the risks of the status quo” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 38).  Past studies 
conducted by agencies such as the Congressional Budget Office (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2005) show that the increased response time, due to the vast distances from the 
continental United States to any flash point, along with the increased threat to 
interdiction, of crossing 6216 kilometers (Pearl Harbor, Hawaii to Yokosuka, Japan) of 
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open ocean in times of crisis would be more than just costly.  Additional existing 
examinations, of the logistical challenges to mobilizing and deploying military units from 
the United States to potential trouble spots, includes the Overseas Basing Commission in 
a report prepared for Congress, also in 2005.  Concerning logistical difficulties the 
chairman stated “the commission found significant faults – shortcomings in the domestic 
rail and port infrastructure needed for deployment, as well as serious limitations in sea- 
and airlift capacity to likely zones of conflict” (Cornella, 2010).  Parent and MacDonald 
also call for the “shifting of commitments and resources from peripheral to core interests 
and preserving investments in the most valuable geographic and functional areas” (Parent 
and MacDonald, 2011, p. 40) without identifying where these areas are.  Few would 
argue that the East and South China Seas are not “in the most valuable geographic and 
functional areas,” and that maintaining the existing “commitments, resources and 
investments” is not in the interests of the United States, whether those interests are 
economic or geopolitical.   
Ultimately, Parent and MacDonald provide an incomplete picture of the overseas 
basing structure, particularly as it relates to East Asia, and fail to present an adequate 
direction in which planners should start.  They call on the United States to maintain only 
“rapid response forces” in “valuable geographic and functional areas” without identifying 
what that force structure would entail or where it could be stationed.    
2.8 Summary 
 
 The United States-Japan security alliance is one of the most crucial aspects of 
American foreign policy and military deterrence in Asia.  The maintenance of this 
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relationship is undoubtedly paramount to policy planners during any and all exchanges 
with the government and people of Japan.  The goal of removing unsustainable, high risk 
military bases in the middle of urban centers is laudable and desired by military planners 
and civilian populations.  Yet the decision of where to move those bases must be 
critically examined rather than hastily decided.  Factors such as the purpose of these 
military forces being stationed in Japan must be clarified, the complicated histories of 
Japan with its regional neighbors must be understood and the burden of military forces 
stationed on Okinawa must be addressed.  The past plan to move units to a new base 
created off the Henoko peninsula, the so called Futenma Replacement Facility, fails to do 
this and instead places political expediency ahead of well-considered strategic and 
environmental planning (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. 6).   
The literature presents several questions that must be answered concerning the 
current realignment plan of United States military forces on Okinawa.  The controversy 
surrounding the stationing and potential relocation of United States military forces on 
Okinawa has caused complications to the otherwise stable United States-Japanese 
relationship.  Addressing this controversy is crucial to the maintenance of positive 
relations between the two states and developing clear, appropriate solutions that can 
survive the test of time. 
To accomplish this, criteria must be developed to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of the currently proposed relocation plans and alternate future proposals.  
The previous examination of the history and current status of United States military 
forces in Japan provide a clear basis for which to develop these criteria.  This study will 
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therefore use the following criteria in the analysis of current and future basing proposals 
of United States military units in Japan: 
1. The current base structure on Okinawa is not conducive to positive United States-
Japanese relations; 
2. Any restructure of United States military units and bases in Japan must consider 
their role concerning the potential outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula; 
3. United States military forces in Japan act as an honest broker and stabilizing force 
while the region continues to struggle with difficult memories of the past; 
4. The maintenance of United States military forces in Japan is critical to the 
security and foreign policy objectives of the United States. 
Effective and sustainable stationing of United States military units in Japan must 
address these criteria or risk deficiencies to military capabilities in the region, whether 
they be due to poor positioning of military units in relation to contingencies or from local 
base controversies that affect the Japanese national decision-making process. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 Utilizing data provided from the annually published Base Structure Report, published 
by the Office of Installations and Environment within the Department of Defense, this 
research will examine and map the basing and unit allocation of United States military 
forces in Japan on a prefecture basis.  Next, maps of these bases will be overlaid with 
population densities of Japan to understand better the bases’ potential effects on local 
populations.  Combined with this, an overlay of Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) bases 
will be created for the consideration of joint basing between United States-JSDF forces. 
Finally, geographic distance between core units of the 3rd MEF will be examined and a 
map will be created to illustrate distance constraints.  With these tools in place, a better 
understanding of the existing relocation plan, or any alternate relocation plans, can 
provide the geographic framework for recommendations to policy-makers. 
3.2 Base Structure Report 
 
 Published in various forms since the 1990s, the Base Structure Report has 
maintained its modern format since 2002 and releases an updated version every 
September 30th.  This report provides “a consolidated summary of annual real property 
inventory data that is reported by each of the Military Departments’ and Washington 
Headquarters Services’ based on their native real property databases” (Department of 
Defense, 2011, p. 2).  Considered a summary of Department of Defense property 
worldwide, it nonetheless provides a detailed account of the majority of American 
military installations that are otherwise not easily, or publicly, attainable. 
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These installations are listed individually with several installations frequently 
making up one base yet listed as a separate line item due to differences in military 
service, mission type or actual physical distance.  Each installation line item includes 
several variables pertinent to this study and includes:   
Nearest City – Identifies the name of the city in which the real property assets are located 
or the name of the city nearest the assets. 
Total Acres – Identifies the total number of acres at the listed site.  It includes public 
land, land owned by other federal agencies and acreage of foreign land used by the 
Department of Defense. 
Plant Replacement Value ($M) – Indicates the total Plant Replacement Value (PRV), in 
millions, for all facilities, per line item.  This value represents the calculated cost to 
replace the current physical plant using today’s construction costs and standards.  Larger 
values equate to installations generally better suited to large numbers of personnel. 
Military Personnel – This is the number of military personnel working at the installation 
as listed in the report.  This number is not an official count of base personnel and is listed 
in the report to reflect ‘relative magnitude’ of service related personnel.  It is used as such 
in the context of this study.  
The 2011 Base Structure Report identifies 85 installations within Japan spread 
throughout 13 of Japan’s 47 prefectures.  Many of these installations actually form parts 
of a major base and represent individual tenant commands within the overarching United 
States military presence in that prefecture.  This study, considering only the realignment 
of major units of United States military forces in Japan, narrowed the installation list 
down to only those installations that either currently, or have the potential to, support 
large numbers of additional air and ground units, such as those of the 3rd Marine 
Expeditionary Force.  Table 3.1 shows the installations included by these criteria. 
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Table 3.1 Major Installations of United States Forces Japan 
Criteria Base Type Prefecture Installation Name 
Branch of 
Service 
PRV Large Site Marine Base Okinawa Camp Kinser USMC Active 
PRV Medium 
Site Air Base Okinawa MCAS Futenma USMC Active 
PRV Large Site Marine Base Okinawa Camp Foster USMC Active 
PRV Large Site Air Base Okinawa Kadena AB USAF Active 
Major 
Installation Marine Base Okinawa Camp Courtney USMC Active 
PRV Medium 
Site Marine Base Okinawa Camp Hansen USMC Active 
Major 
Installation Training Okinawa Camp Gonsalves USMC Active 
Major 
Installation Naval Base Nagasaki Sasebo Navy Active 
PRV Large Site Air Base Yamaguchi MCAS Iwakuni USMC Active 
Major 
Installation Naval Base Kanagawa Yokosuka Navy Active 
PRV Large Site Air Base Kanagawa Atsugi Navy Active 
PRV Medium 
Site Marine Base Kanagawa Camp Zama Army Active 
PRV Large Site Air Base Tokyo Yokota AB USAF Active 
PRV Large Site Air Base Aomori Misawa AB USAF Active 
Data Source: Department of Defense (2011) 
There are two primary limitations with the usage of the Base Structure Report and 
it is important to note them, though generally, they are not prohibitive to this specific 
study.  First, only overseas installations “larger than 10 acres OR have a Plant 
Replacement Value (PRV) greater than $10 million will be shown” as line item entries on 
the installation list (Department of Defense, 2011, p. 4).  Installations not meeting these 
criteria are totaled under a single line item entry entitled Other which is the final entry for 
each state. 
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Next, not all Department of Defense installations are listed on this report as 
evidenced by a complete exclusion of any and all reference to installations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq or certain other states hosting American military units during the 
Global War on Terror such as Kyrgyzstan (Schwirtz, 2011).  Though this does not 
directly affect the purposes of this study, to the author’s knowledge, the fact that gaps 
exist in the report must be considered. 
3.3 Japanese Self Defense Force Bases 
 
Japan is not solely protected by military forces of the United States and maintains 
a capable military force charged with protecting Japanese interests and borders within 
Japanese sovereign territory.  These forces, collectively called the Japanese Self Defense 
Force (JSDF), are stationed throughout the islands of Japan and frequently train, supply 
and coordinate operations with United States military forces in Japan.  For the purposes 
of this study and the realignment of forces from Okinawa, JSDF major bases throughout 
the islands of Japan will be considered as possible locations for the realignment of the 3rd 
MEF. 
Similar to United States military forces in Japan, the JSDF maintains many 
installations, large and small, throughout the islands of Japan.  Utilizing the Japanese 
Ministry of Defense’s public listing of units and bases (Japanese Ministry of Defense, 
2011; 2012a; 2012b), this study narrowed down the possible list of relocation sites to 
only JSDF forces on the Division (ground forces totaling 5,000 or more), Fleet (a 
squadron of destroyers or more), or Wing level (a squadron of fighter planes or more).  
This provides a listing of major JSDF bases throughout Japan that could possibly support 
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the relocation of the 3rd MEF.  Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of these major JSDF 
bases throughout Japan. 
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Figure 3.1 Major Japanese Self Defense Force bases throughout Japan.  Data Source: 
Japanese Ministry of Defense (2011, 2012a, 2012b). 
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3.4 United States Military Transportation Capabilities 
 
A factor not frequently discussed in the literature, yet extremely important in the 
viability of military units, is the transportation and range of military units.  No discussion 
on the relocation of military units can ignore the transportation requirements imposed 
upon them by the geography of the region.  In the case of East Asia and the Pacific, this 
is particularly a problem due to the vast expanses of open-ocean, which are only 
infrequently broken by small atolls or sparsely inhabited islands. 
The relocation of United States military units from Okinawa to any planned or 
alternate location must consider this challenge as it relates to their mission.  United States 
military units on Okinawa form just a portion of both United States forces in Japan, 
called United States Forces Japan (USFJ), and the unified combatant command, Pacific 
Command (USPACOM).  USFJ, itself a subordinate command under USPACOM, 
oversees all American military forces in Japan regardless of service affiliation.  This is 
especially important given the requirement for intra-service cooperation, as it relates to 
transportation and logistics, in the East Asian-Pacific region.  Given the vast distances 
between non-hostile land territories in the region, only naval vessels or long-range 
aircraft can provide the necessary endurance capability to transport military units.   
Naval 
 
In order to meet these requirements, the Marine units on Okinawa, which are 
considered an Expeditionary Force, have specific naval ships assigned for transportation 
and logistics requirements in order to move them to any potential contingency location.  
These ships, designated Amphibious Squadron 11 (Phibron 11), are currently stationed in 
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Sasebo, Japan, on the island of Kyushu.  Comprised of one amphibious assault ship (USS 
Essex), one amphibious transport dock (USS Denver), and two dock landing ships (USS 
Tortuga and USS Germantown), Phibron 11 is responsible for transportation and the 
amphibious operations of Marine units currently stationed on Okinawa.  With a mission 
statement to “provide centralized planning embarkation, movement, control, coordination 
and integration of all aspects of Amphibious Warfare” (United States Navy, 2012) these 
ships provide a ‘you call, we haul’ capability required to meet the demands of 
expeditionary Marine units such as those currently on Okinawa.  Current relocation plans 
for elements of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force do not include any planned move for 
ships of Phibron 11.  Therefore, for the purposes of this study, it is not expected that the 
homeport of any of these transport ships will be changed in the coming years and Sasebo 
will be utilized as the starting point for any required movements of these ships. 
 With the support of refueling vessels, the ships of Phibron 11 have the capability 
to transport an entire expeditionary unit around the world.  Their limiting factor is speed 
and not distance.  Though much has changed in technology for air and ground 
transportation in the past hundred years, maritime travel has remained relatively static in 
speed at around 20 knots or 37 kilometers per hour (Webb, 2007, p. 301-302).  This 
equates to approximately 900 kilometers per day with Table 3.2 showing the estimated 
one-way travel times with a starting point of Sasebo, Japan.  Adding to these times is the 
process of embarkation or loading of all required units, supplies and equipment.  This 
process takes between one and a half to three days to complete, in good conditions, once 
the ships have docked at the embarkation point (Tabios, 2007; Kyhl, 2011). 
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Table 3.2 Distance and travel times for Amphibious Squadron 11 stationed in Sasebo, 
Japan 
Sasebo to: 
Distance 
(km) 
Travel 
Time 
Okinawa 746  20 hrs 
Subic Bay, 
Philippines 2523  68 hrs 
Guam 2751  74 hrs 
Singapore 4617 124 hrs 
Darwin, Australia 5100 137 hrs 
    
Once fully loaded, the squadron will travel to the contingency location and 
conduct operations in accordance with the mission.  Though the process is relatively 
straightforward, the current separation of forces, Phibron 11 in Sasebo and the 3rd 
Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa, creates, in the minimum, a delay of three days, 
from activation to delivery, in the event of contingency operations in Korea or Japan. 
Any relocation of these Marine units to locations further than Okinawa from 
Sasebo will create increased delay times.  Therefore the role of geographic distance from 
Sasebo, Japan, the home port of Phibron 11, to any proposed relocation site for the 3rd 
Marine Expeditionary Force will be considered a criterion to determine relocation 
viability. 
Air 
 
Given the vast distances involved in transportation within the East Asian-Pacific 
theatre, air transportation would initially seem an ideal alternative to naval transportation.  
Though air travel is faster it suffers from several negative inherent factors that make it 
less preferable than maritime travel.  First amongst these is lift capability and cost.  The 
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United States maintains several long range aircraft capable of transporting Marine 
infantry units and portions of their equipment.  Yet full deployment of artillery, rotary 
and potential armor units becomes prohibitive through air travel alone.  When cost is 
factored in, the reality of too little being delivered for too high of a cost becomes 
apparent.  For example, during the First Gulf War, “the United States [spent] $2.37 
billion on airlift, which was more than half the total $4.57 billion spent on transport 
during the whole campaign” (Webb, 2007, p. 303) while only transporting 10% of the 
supplies and equipment through air transport.  Additionally, it is not apparent that 
sufficient large air transports will be positioned in locations capable for re-positioning the 
3rd MEF in case of contingency operations.  
Another factor is the type of contingency operations to which the 3rd Marine 
Expeditionary Force would be responding.  In the case of a humanitarian crisis, such as 
the 2004 or 2011 tsunamis, air transports can expect friendly air corridors through which 
to travel and deliver military forces providing assistance.  Unfortunately, this situation 
cannot be assumed in the case of contingency operations when the use of force is 
expected.  Instead the likelihood that these Marine expeditionary forces will be entering a 
combat zone with hostile or contested skies is highly likely, thereby calling into question 
the feasibility of delivering these quick response units safely. 
A final factor in the discussion on air transportation with the 3rd Marine 
Expeditionary Force is the capabilities of attached helicopter transports.  Currently the 3rd 
Marine Expeditionary Force contains several squadrons of CH-46s which serve as 
medium lift, short range transports for elements of the 3rd MEF.  The CH-46s, with a 
combat radius of 296 kilometers, have provided the Marine Corps with the required 
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battlefield transportation capability needed to maneuver and succeed in its expeditionary 
mission since the Vietnam War.  Yet due to its age they suffer from slower speeds and 
shorter ranges than alternate options available.   
In order to support the ongoing expeditionary role of the Marine Corps, the 
Department of Defense contracted with Boeing to purchase the newly developed MV-22 
to replace existing CH-46 squadrons throughout the Marine Corps.  Though troubled by 
early design flaws the MV-22 has nonetheless earned high praise from Marine Corps 
commanders since its first combat missions in Iraq in 2007 (Federal News Service, 
2009).  This has been primarily due to its increased range, combat radius of 1,111 
kilometers, and speed of 443 kilometers an hour (Boeing, 2012b) versus the 248 
kilometers an hour for the CH-46 (Boeing, 2012a). 
3.5 Summary 
 
 The methods and procedures detailed above will assist in critically examining the 
current realignment plan of the 3rd MEF as presented by the Governments of Japan and 
the United States, along with developing any alternate realignment plan required.   
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4. Examination of the current relocation plan 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 The relocation of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force from various facilities 
throughout Okinawa, though primarily MCAS Futenma, to an alternate location either 
within the prefecture of Okinawa or out of Japan, has been shown to have gone through 
several iterations.  Discussed primarily since 1995, these relocation plans have failed to 
pass the planning stages as Japanese domestic politics vacillate between acquiescing to 
American demands for a new offshore base to arguing for the complete removal of all 
American military forces from Okinawa. 
The most controversial plan thus far had been the Futenma Replacement Facility, 
which sought to reclaim land off the Henoko Peninsula and build runways over a 
nationally protected environmental site.  Encountering stiff resistance at the local level, 
this plan had progressed forward until the fall of 2011 when the United States agreed to 
separate the discussion of the new runways off Henoko with the transfer of large portions 
of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force off of Okinawa (Takenaka, 2012).  The transfer of 
these forces off of Okinawa seems to satisfy many of the complaints of the Japanese 
public.  Yet an examination of how these new locations support United States policies in 
the region, through the application of the criteria established above, must be completed to 
ensure the relocation supports the strategic view rather than short term diplomatic goals.  
4.2 The Current Realignment Plan 
 
 The current relocation plan calls for the transfer of thousands of Marines of the 3rd 
Marine Expeditionary Force to locations throughout the Pacific including Hawaii, Guam, 
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Australia and the Philippines.  Shifting from their current basing on Okinawa, these units 
will either re-engage long-time traditional allies that have not seen the large-scale 
permanent stationing of American military units in over twenty years or will return to the 
United States in an effort to reduce the number of Marines on Okinawa.  The current 
relocation plan calls for reducing the number of Marines on Okinawa to a cap of 10,000, 
thereby forcing the United States to relocate at least 8,000 Marines to alternate locations 
(Navy Times, 2012).  Though these plans remain fluid, the outline below is the most 
recognized relocation plan of these Marines as described by various government officials 
of both states. 
Guam 
 
 Hosting by far the largest shift in the relocation plan, Guam, an American 
territory, stands poised to receive 4,700 Marines of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force 
from Okinawa in combination with several military improvement projects on the island 
(Kan, 2012).  Originally slated to receive 8,000 Marines, Guam still offers several 
challenges to the Marine Corps as adequate training, and specifically live fire drills, are 
unavailable on the island requiring new facilities be developed and utilized on the 
relatively nearby island of Tinian (Kan, 2012, p. 9). 
Australia 
 
 In a new security arrangement agreed upon during President Obama’s November 
visit to Australia, portions of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force will build up a presence 
in Darwin, Australia eventually totaling 2,500 by 2016.  The first time American military 
forces have been stationed in Australia since the Vietnam War, these units are to support 
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the United States reengagement with states of South East Asia and balance the force 
posture of East Asia from being primarily focused in North East Asia to one that is 
visible throughout the entire region (Nicholas & Parsons, 2011; Kan, 2012, p. 4-9). 
Other locations 
 
 Several other locations have been named to be recipients of Marines of the 3rd 
Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa.  Hawaii, with its large existing military 
presence, is expected to receive 1,000 (Navy Times, 2012) while Singapore and the 
Philippines, already home to small detachments of United States military forces, are in 
negotiations with the United States to host an unknown number of 3rd MEF Marines 
(Kan, 8, 2012; Tritten, 2012). 
Remarking on the new deployment strategy, one Stars and Stripes reporter, based 
on comments from official sources, states “The new deployments and bases could 
combine with existing units in Japan, Hawaii and California to create a string of Marine 
Corps forces that stretches 7,700 miles and projects as far as the Indian Ocean” (Tritten, 
2012).  Not mentioned is how these forces will interact and serve the overarching 
missions and agendas of the 3rd MEF itself and United States regional foreign policy as a 
whole.  Figure 4.1 shows the projected regional locations of the relocated Marines of the 
3rd MEF. 
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Figure 4.1 Planned realignment locations of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force.  
Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Basing Data Source: 
Department of Defense (2011). 
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4.3 Critical Analysis through the Criteria 
 
 The planned diversification of United States military forces on Okinawa to 
locations throughout the Pacific at first seems to satisfy the needs of sustaining the United 
States-Japanese alliance and preserving our forward presence in East Asia.  Yet broader 
concerns with United States military and foreign policy in the region do not seem to have 
been addressed. 
Early discussions by the Overseas Basing Commission in 2005 on the relocation 
of Marines from Okinawa to Guam faced criticism from the Commission itself stating 
“Nor are we sure that current discussions on relocating U.S. forces on Okinawa 
adequately addresses strategic concerns for U.S. security interests in East Asia” 
(Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. ii).  How then does the planned relocation match 
the criteria established?  The section below applies each of the four criteria individually 
to the existing relocation plans to determine if it matches the needs and purpose of 
American strategy in East Asia. 
Criterion 1: The current base structure on Okinawa is not conducive to positive US-
Japanese relations 
 Perhaps the most readily apparent of any of the criteria, the removal of thousands 
of Marines from Okinawa to any location out of the prefecture is conducive to 
improvements in US-Japanese relations.  The planned cap of 10,000 Marines, along with 
the removal of 8,000, signals a final shift, however gradual, in policy amongst the 
prefectural Government of Okinawa, the federal government in Tokyo and the United 
States. 
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Considered a win to many Okinawans, these relocations though will leave many 
American military facilities open on the island with specific units and installations still 
undecided such as the Futenma Replacement Facility, the scope of units on Kadena Air 
Base and whether Marine Aircraft Group 36, the helicopter unit a part of the 3rd MEF, 
will remain on Okinawa or be transferred elsewhere.  With these questions still 
unanswered, domestic politics in Japan, and therefore the United States-Japanese 
alliance, will continue to face opposition. 
Criterion 2: Any restructure of American military units and bases in Japan must consider 
their role concerning the potential outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula 
 The most direct problem with the relocation of portions of the 3rd MEF from 
Okinawa to different locations across the Pacific is how these elements would come 
together or respond to a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, or arguably anywhere, in 
force.  With almost 8,000 miles of ocean separating elements of the 3rd MEF, little has 
been publicized on how these separate elements will travel, train or participate as a larger 
military unit such as they do now on Okinawa.  Questions concerning which units will be 
transferred, infantry, armor, air, artillery, or a combination of all four, have not been 
answered beyond the rough estimates of personnel figures.  No information, for instance 
on the disbursement of the Marine Aircraft Group 36, containing squadrons of helicopters 
detested by the Okinawans, has been released or even if they will leave Okinawa at all.  
Additionally the logistics complications of these units, spread throughout the Pacific, 
have not been addressed or seemingly accounted for.  Discussing these types of concerns 
in 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission stated: 
Our military forces must be able to meet the force projection demands 
placed on them under existing strategies and plans. Their training and 
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equipment must be adequate to the task, access to key locations assured, 
and units and bases protected to the degree commensurate with the risks 
we ask our service men and women to undertake. It is not clear that all of 
these concerns have been addressed. 
 
A central objective of a rebasing strategy is to ensure availability of 
requisite combat power at the point of need. As we return forces from 
overseas, shift them within and between combatant commands, and 
transform them into more readily deployable units we seek an outcome of 
enhanced mobility.  The Commission is concerned, however, that 
adequate strategic sealift, airlift, and prepositioned equipment and stocks 
do not exist and that current intra-theater airlift is over-stressed. Aside 
from the lift capability, the Commission is also concerned that the air and 
sea ports, inter-nodal connectivities and other mobility enabling systems 
are not adequate to meet potential contingencies. Moreover, the 
Commission notes that budgetary plans for mobility assets are inadequate 
to meet projected lift demand. (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, p. iv) 
 
Therefore, the need for clear guidance on the mobility of American forces 
realigning in the Pacific is crucial to their combat readiness.  Even without 
knowing the exact distribution of 3rd MEF units throughout the Pacific, two 
courses of actions can be posited that span the spectrum from the most logistically 
simple to the most complex. 
Personnel only 
 A personnel-only plan is the most straightforward realignment of forces in the 
Pacific.  They could be relocated to these alternate bases with none of their supporting 
equipment such as tanks, helicopters or artillery.  Beyond creating an obvious challenge 
for training, the preservation of units with this equipment, such as the Marine Aircraft 
Group 36 on Okinawa, would fail to satisfy the demands of the Okinawans and the first 
criterion of this examination.  Furthermore, as the Overseas Basing Commission 
highlighted above, the strategic airlift requirements for these widely dispersed units are 
either not in place or insufficient to transport the realigned units back to Okinawa or a 
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central location where they could be embarked by elements of Phibron 11, the Naval 
ships designated to transport them to locations of need.  Unable to reunite with their host 
and command units on Okinawa, these 8,000 Marines would either be delayed from 
entering any contingency operation ordered for the 3rd MEF or hinder the ability of the 3rd 
MEF to respond to a contingency operation in the first place.  As the simplest option for 
the realignment of forces from Okinawa throughout the Pacific, such outcomes call into 
question the expected purpose, in the eyes of force planners, of the 3rd MEF being 
forward deployed in the Pacific at all. 
Personnel and Heavy Equipment 
 Realigning whole units of Marines with their equipment, tanks, helicopters and 
artillery is the more complex option for realigning forces in the Pacific.  This would 
support their training missions and maintain high levels of readiness, desired by any 
military commander, and their response to a contingency operation ordered for the 3rd 
MEF. 
Considering only the travel and embarkation times for Phibron 11 from Sasebo to 
Guam to Okinawa, in order to embark the largest number of Marines and equipment in 
the shortest amount of time, there is significant delay from the initial warning order to 
deployable readiness; see Figure 4.2 below for the estimated travel delay.  In this 
scenario, traveling to and embarking Marines and equipment relocated to Australia, 
Singapore or the Philippines would present too large a delay.  The resulting absence 
would weaken the capabilities of the 3rd MEF.  Parent and MacDonald (2011), though 
calling for a decline in American military forces in Japan, recognize that response times 
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to contingency operations are crucial and state that “defending the territorial integrity of 
Japan and South Korea and preventing Chinese or North Korean adventurism demands 
rapid-response forces with strong reserves” (Parent and MacDonald, 2011, p. 43).  It is 
hard to see therefore how diffusing geographically the 3rd MEF will preserve its current 
rapid response capability in support of its forward-deployed mission. 
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Figure 4.2 Straight line travel distance and travel time for Amphibious Squadron 
11 departing Sasebo, Japan for Guam then Okinawa.  Embarkation times are not 
included.  Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012).  Travel 
times based on Phibron 11’s speed of 37/km/hr. 
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In any scenario that separates elements of a military division, it must be 
understood that, though they are in many cases separate entities, artillery, armor, and 
infantry, these elements work and fight as a whole force.  The separation and likelihood 
of only partial deployment of the whole presents operational planners with difficult 
decisions during contingency operations.  Should partial units respond to the contingency 
while not at full operational capability?  Or should the unit be fully reconstituted, creating 
a delay, before it is deployed and thereby increase the risk of the contingency becoming 
more difficult to address?  Finally, should the unit not be allocated contingency 
operations due to the many unknowns revolving around its logistical dilemmas?  
Questions such as these, and the difficult answers they develop, seriously call into 
question the wide distribution of the 3rd MEF across the vast expanses of the Pacific 
Ocean. 
Criterion 3: American military forces in Japan act as an ‘honest broker’ and stabilizing 
force while the region continues to struggle with difficult memories of the past 
 The removal of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to outside of Japan will signal a 
declining commitment of the United States to Japanese and South Korean security as 
rising regional competitors continue to flex their increased military and political clout.  
Japan’s Yoshida Doctrine of relying on the United States for security while capping 
domestic defense spending and capabilities may come under fire as revisionists seek to 
redefine Japan in the 21st century through a loosening of restrictions on weapons sales 
and development along with increased military deployments (Heginbotham, Ratner and 
Samuels, 2011, p. 140-148).  The move of Japan to become a normal nation and maintain 
its own military (Samuels, 2008, p. 5-6) is likely to become stronger (Samuels, 2008, p. 
181-183).  In the context of a recent history of military aggression throughout the region, 
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this is likely to encourage states such as North and South Korea, Russia and China to 
develop military policies against any rise in Japanese militarism.  Conversely, states such 
as Singapore and the Philippines will likely welcome an increased American military 
presence as China expands naval operations in the South China Sea, though there is no 
requirement that elements of the 3rd MEF fulfill this need.  Rotations and stationing of 
American military personnel in these, and other states such as Australia, should come 
from units currently stationed outside of Japan.  Only by doing so, and preserving the 
levels of American military forces in Japan at current levels, can the United States 
provide the security guarantee sought by the Yoshida Doctrine. 
Criterion 4: The maintenance of United States military forces in Japan is critical to the 
security and foreign policy objectives of the United States 
 The stationing of United States military forces in Japan provides the United States 
with a stable, regional presence, demonstrating our commitment to allies and security 
partners throughout the region.  Japan, balanced off the coast of the Asian continent as 
the United Kingdom is off the coast of the European continent, offers much in the way of 
access for economic, political and military reasons.  Therefore maintaining adequate 
levels of combat power in Japan supports the wide range of missions of the United States 
while presenting a visible deterrent to any land power seeking to expand in the region.  
The removal of significant portions of these combat forces signals a weakening of resolve 
on the part of the United States at a time when our leaders seek to deepen our regional 
commitment (Lothian and Jansen, 2011).  Furthermore, as discussed above relating to 
Korea, the dispersion of the 3rd MEF throughout the Pacific, instead of maintaining unit 
coherency, questions the responsiveness and operational viability of the unit to regional 
contingency operations, and particularly ones involving combat operations.  Rear 
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Admiral Dur, the former Director of the Strategy and Policy Division in the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations, has discussed the importance of force posture and stationing 
and had this to say on forward-deployed naval forces such as the 3rd MEF: 
Presence forces are shaped for combat.  Forward deployed naval forces 
provide the critical link between peacetime operations and the initial 
requirements for a developing crisis or major regional contingency.  Their 
forcible entry capabilities provide the initial response and enabling 
capability for subsequent joint operations on a large scale in the event of 
conflict. 
Our defense commitments and global interests require a robust forward 
naval presence.  Forward presence has been a trademark of the Navy and 
the Marine Corps. And its importance is likely to grow in the uncertain 
future.  If we can identify specific national interests and regional 
objectives that can be advanced or protected by naval power, we can then 
determine the levels of forces necessary to secure those interests.  
Defining the forces we need for presence need not be guesswork. 
Naval forces – like all elements of a military arsenal – are built to fight 
and win wars.  But their most important role by far is to be positioned to 
prevent them.  Sized and configured to meet military objectives, naval 
forces serve the nation’s varied interests on a regular and continuous basis 
– in the littorals and on the open ocean, where U.S. economic security 
turns on free access in the world’s markets and resources. 
In this regard, the past really is prologue.  Naval forces deployed forward 
will remain the front line in our transoceanic strategy (Dur, 2000, p. 479). 
The need therefore to maintain combat ready forces in Japan, which the current 
realignment plan does not consider, is crucial to United States security and foreign 
policy.  
4.4 Summary 
 
 The United States’ current realignment plan for elements of the 3rd MEF to 
relocate to distant location throughout the Pacific does not take into consideration several 
factors relating to its military and foreign policy mission.  Discussions on how logistics 
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will be managed between the new locations or how the 3rd MEF will respond to any 
contingency operation have neither been discussed nor seemingly planned for.  
Additionally the domestic politics of Japan, as it relates to military development and 
normalization, has not been considered.  Finally, the re-posturing of United States 
military forces throughout East Asia, though important for our relations with states in 
South East Asia such as the Philippines and Singapore, ultimately fails to consider 
alternate military units such as the 2nd MEF stationed in San Diego.  Doing so would 
maintain the unit coherency of the 3rd MEF and provide a combat-ready deterrent 
available for any regional contingency operation.  The Overseas Basing Commission 
identified the lack of long-term planning on the part of the Department of Defense and its 
statements hold as true for the current realignment plan as in 2005: 
Our base structure is not merely a derivative of strategy; it is a driver in its 
own right.  It must, therefore be fully integrated with every other facet of 
strategy before it can properly affixed.  It is our opinion that the enormity 
of this point, and the discussion that it demands, has not been taken into 
account to the degree that it merits (Overseas Basing Commission, 2005, 
p. 6).   
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Chapter 5: Alternate Relocation Plans 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 Realignment plans developed by the Governments of the United States and Japan 
have thus far been unable to provide options that satisfy the requirements of the United 
States’ regional objectives while addressing the domestic concerns of Japanese civilians 
on Okinawa.  The need therefore to examine alternate plans that satisfy the criteria 
established is clear.  Any alternate realignment plan must consider the criteria established 
and must satisfy them better than the existing plan as put forth by the United States.   
A review of the criteria recognizes that the most limiting factor for the 
realignment of forces are the logistics and transportation factors.  The dispersing of the 
3rd MEF throughout the Pacific and then requiring adequate transportation back to either 
a centralized location or the actual contingency location has not been addressed and 
presents the most serious challenge to operational planners.  The need therefore to realign 
the 3rd MEF within a reasonable travel distance from Sasebo, Japan, the homeport of 
Phibron 11, their assigned naval transportation, would be logical to minimize travel times 
and maximize operational capability.  Additionally the maintenance of these forces, if 
possible within Japan but outside the prefecture of Okinawa, would support United States 
military and foreign policy objectives in the region.  Therefore locations on the main 
islands of Japan (Kyushu, Honshu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido) should be considered with a 
preference for established military locations with low population densities in order to 
prevent a planning challenge such as happened on Okinawa from reoccurring.  With clear 
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guidelines on the requirements for an alternate realignment plan the options can be 
mapped out and selected, based on their satisfaction of the criteria. 
5.2 The Alternatives 
 
 First, the spatial and temporal distance or radius for acceptable realignment 
locations must be established.  This alternate realignment plan sets the existing spatial 
and temporal distance of Sasebo, Japan to Naha, Japan as the acceptable standard by 
which alternate realignment locations can be measured.  With a distance of 746 
kilometers, ships of Phibron 11, traveling at an average speed of 20 knots (37 km/h) 
would take 20 hours of pure travel time to travel, one way, between the two locations.  
Therefore the spatial factor is 746 kilometers and the temporal factor is 20 hours.  
Portions of Japan that fall within this radius include the regions of Kyushu, Shikoku, 
Chūgoku, and Kansai, along with all or a portion of the prefectures of Aichi, Gifu, 
Shizuoka, Nagano, Ishikawa and Toyama in the Chūbu region.  Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
extent of the spatial radius from Sasebo, Japan, including major bases of United States 
Forces Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Forces.   
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Figure 5.1 Current travel distance of Amphibious Squadron 11 from Sasebo to Okinawa.  
Radius reflects all locations within the same travel distance.  Map Data Source: Global 
Administrative Database (2012). Basing Data Source: Department of Defense (2011) and 
Japanese Ministry of Defense (2011, 2012a, 2012b). 
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As reflected in Figure 5.1, several locations of USFJ and JSDF forces on the 
islands of Kyushu, Honshu and Shikoku are within the acceptable range of Phibron 11.  
Additionally, Figure 6.1 provides guidance on more acceptable prefectures, based on 
population density, than Okinawa, which has a higher population density of 612 
residents/km2.  Utilizing this, the prefectures that would be suitable for the relocation of 
the 3rd MEF, taking into consideration those that currently host major USFJ or JSDF 
forces, and have a lower population density than Okinawa, can be tabulated for 
consideration.  These prefectures are listed in Table 6.1.   
Table 5.1 Prefectures within Phibron 11’s acceptable range that currently host USFJ or 
JSDF units and have a lower population density than Okinawa. 
Prefecture 
Major USFJ Units 
Present Major JSDF Units Present 
Population 
Density / km2 
Hiroshima Minor Depots 4th Escort Flotilla 337 
Ishikawa None 6th Air Wing 280 
Kagoshima None 1st Fleet Air Wing 186 
Kumamoto None 8th Division 245 
Kyoto None 3rd Escort Flotilla 572 
Miyagi None 5th Air Wing 322 
Nagasaki Phibron 11 
2nd Escort Flotilla, 22nd Fleet 
Air Wing 348 
Yamaguchi MCAS Iwakuni 31st Fleet Air Wing 237 
Data Source: Department of Defense (2011) and Japanese Ministry of Defense (2011, 
2012a, 2012b). 
The eight prefectures listed in Table 6.1 provide guidance on possible alternate 
locations for the relocation of the 3rd MEF from Okinawa.  A final, if less likely, 
transportation factor to consider is the possibility of elements of the 3rd MEF responding 
to a contingency operation on the Korean Peninsula by means of their integrated air 
transport only.  This integrated air transport, in the form of the MV-22 Osprey, can 
provide a mission radius of 1,111 kilometers to elements of the 3rd MEF, facilitating rapid 
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deployment to possible contingency operations within this range.  Likely locations within 
South Korea that the 3rd MEF would respond to, if only to layover for supplies and 
refueling, include Kunsan Air Base, a part of United States Forces Korea (USFK), and 
Daegu Air Base, a base of the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROK AFB).  These bases are 
distant enough from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the most likely combat area with 
anti-aircraft capabilities, and maintain sufficient fuel and accommodations to serve either 
as a layover or temporary forward location in South Korea for elements of the 3rd MEF 
transported by MV-22s. 
 Figure 5.2 depicts the combat radius of the MV-22, centered on the Republic of 
Korea Air Force Base in Daegu3 to reflect areas within Japan that could serve as the 
permanent home of the 3rd MEF, with attached MV-22s, and reach this potential 
temporary location during a crisis on the Korea Peninsula.  Due to the wide combat 
radius of the MV-22, most of Japan, excluding Hokkaido, is within this radius, including 
all the USFJ and JSDF bases selected from Figure 6.1.  
 The relocating of the 3rd MEF from Okinawa to any of the potential bases 
identified in Figure 6.1 satisfies the entire criteria established in Chapter 3.  Locations 
such as MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi prefecture or any of the bases near Sasebo in 
Nagasaki prefecture could support the 3rd MEF and offer less potential for domestic 
disturbance than Okinawa.  Additionally, the maintenance of the 3rd MEF within Japan 
                                                          
3
 Daegu Air Base was chosen over Kunsan due to its closer proximity to Japan and 
increased distance from the DMZ.  Though Japan and South Korea maintain stiff 
relations and are engaged in several international disputes, it is assumed that United 
States military forces would be accepted at a Korean base, particularly during a crisis. 
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and their proximity to the Korean Peninsula would appear to support all United States 
military and foreign policy objectives. 
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Figure 5.2 MV-22 combat radius if responding to contingency operations on the Korean 
Peninsula.  Map Data Source: Global Administrative Database (2012). Basing Data 
Source: Department of Defense (2011).  MV-22 Source: Boeing (2012b) 
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5.3 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has identified several alternate locations within Japan for the 
relocation of the 3rd MEF from Okinawa in lieu of existing plans that spread the 3rd MEF 
throughout the Pacific.  Any of the major military facilities within the eight prefectures 
identified could adequately serve as the new home of the 3rd MEF, either in force or in 
sections separated by minimal land distances and thereby maintaining coherency.  It is up 
to military planners and diplomatic officials to work with the Government of Japan to 
identify which one will be the most domestically acceptable option. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 The goal of this thesis was to analyze the current realignment plan of United 
States military forces on Okinawa and offer alternatives that focus on the strategic 
operations of the 3rd MEF, rather than the short-term political desires of both 
governments. 
 Through the establishment of criteria detailing the mission of the 3rd Marine 
Expeditionary Force, the foreign policy objectives of the United States and strategic 
theory, this thesis was able to show that current realignment plans of United States 
military forces on Okinawa fail to account for several critical factors.  The transportation 
and logistics element of supporting dispersed quick response units has not been 
considered nor planned for.  Contingency operations on the Korean Peninsula, arguably 
the purpose for the United States Forces Japan’s stationing, has also not been adequately 
planned for. 
 The alternate relocation option presented would see elements of the 3rd Marine 
Expeditionary Force relocate to existing military facilities on Kyushu or Honshu in 
low[er] population density prefectures.  Though challenges exist to alternate plans such 
as these (Burke and Sumida, 2012), the proposed option presented offers the most viable 
alternative to the existing plan and meets the military and foreign policy objectives of the 
United States. 
Additionally the possibility of joint basing, or combined bases between United 
States Forces Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Force, will support the alliance 
through increased integration and operability.  The greater the linkage is, the deeper the 
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alliance becomes.  Discussing alliance structure between the United States and its 
European allies, Walt states: “The greater the level of institutionalization within an 
alliance, the more likely it is to endure despite an extensive change in the array of 
external threats” (Walt, 2000, p. 327).  The post-Cold War environment in East Asia has 
seen an evolution of the threats to regional stability and peace.  Gone are the days of the 
threat of global nuclear war.  They have been replaced by a modernizing, robust Chinese 
military flexing its military power in the so-called first island chain (Brookes, 2009).  Not 
to be forgotten, North Korean missile and nuclear development continues unhindered by 
years of economic sanctions (United Nations News Centre, 2012).  In the context of these 
East Asian 21st century power politics, particularly with a Japan that has yet to settle 
long-held emotional memories with its neighboring states, the need for deeper security 
linkages with the United States is paramount to a stable, non-confrontational region. 
In the case of Okinawa, policy planners in both Japan and the United States 
should critically examine the political feasibility of moving existing military units to the 
main islands of Japan to support the United States’ defense commitment and alleviate the 
extraordinary burden placed on the people of Okinawa relative to their fellow citizens on 
Honshu, Kyushu, Hokkaido and Shikoku.  This move would strengthen the United 
States-Japan security alliance, lower or remove anti-American sentiment prevalent 
throughout the country and improve the strategic and tactical requirements of the 
American military objectives in the region. 
Additionally, the spatial and geographic importance of Mackinder and Mahan’s 
theories are shown to remain valid even after nearly a century of geopolitical upheaval.  
The need to maintain modern-day coaling stations for our forces overseas continues to 
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have significance in today’s ever more globalized world.  Though the threat of a Eurasian 
hegemon dominating the heartland has diminished, the need to balance against its rise 
requires an American military presence at crucial locations.  Japan, positioned off the 
Eurasian continent with direct sea lanes of communication and supply to the United 
States, serves as one of these.  Future researchers should consider the continuing 
importance of these theories as, while states, governments, and policies rise and fall, 
geography will remain the same. 
 Looking forward, researchers could utilize the challenges and opportunities 
presented in the case of Okinawa to develop best practices with our partner states in East 
Asia and better posture the United States for what Secretary Clinton recently called 
“America's Pacific century” (Clinton, 2011).  Through this framework of maximizing 
geo-strategic interests, the development needs of the local populations and addressing 
partner states’ concerns for the local environment, researchers should be able to analyze 
more clearly the future of American military and foreign policy both in the Pacific and, 
more broadly, throughout the global basing structure of American overseas forces. 
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Appendix A. 
Criteria Base Type Prefecture Installation Name 
Branch of 
Service 
PRV Large Site Marine Base Okinawa Camp Kinser USMC Active 
PRV Medium 
Site Air Base Okinawa MCAS Futenma USMC Active 
PRV Large Site Marine Base Okinawa Camp Foster USMC Active 
PRV Large Site Air Base Okinawa Kadena AB USAF Active 
Major 
Installation Marine Base Okinawa Camp Courtney USMC Active 
PRV Medium 
Site Marine Base Okinawa Camp Hansen USMC Active 
Major 
Installation Training Okinawa Camp Gonsalves USMC Active 
Major 
Installation Naval Base Nagasaki Sasebo Navy Active 
PRV Large Site Air Base Yamaguchi MCAS Iwakuni USMC Active 
Major 
Installation Naval Base Kanagawa Yokosuka Navy Active 
PRV Large Site Air Base Kanagawa Atsugi Navy Active 
PRV Medium 
Site Marine Base Kanagawa Camp Zama Army Active 
PRV Large Site Air Base Tokyo Yokota AB USAF Active 
PRV Large Site Air Base Aomori Misawa AB USAF Active 
Major Bases of United States Forces Japan. Data Source: Department of Defense (2011). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
81 
 
Appendix B. 
Unit Name Prefecture Location Branch 
2nd Fleet Air Wing Aomori Hachinohe Air 
3rd Air Wing Aomori Misawa Air 
21st Fleet Air Wing Chiba Tateyama Air 
8th Air Wing Fukuoka Tsuiki Air 
2nd Air Wing Hokkaido Chitose Air 
7th Air Wing Ibaraki Hyakuri Air 
6th Air Wing Ishikawa Komatsu Air 
1st Fleet Air Wing Kagoshima Kanoya Air 
4th Fleet Air Wing Kanagawa Atsugi Air 
5th Air Wing Miyazaki Nyutabaru Air 
22nd Fleet Air Wing Nagasaki Omura Air 
83rd Air Wing Okinawa Naha Air 
Central Aircraft Control and Warning 
Wing Saitama Iruma Air 
31st Fleet Air Wing Yamaguchi Iwakuni Air 
10th Division Aichi Moriyama Ground 
9th Division Aomori Aomori Ground 
4th Division Fukuoka Fukuoka Ground 
2nd Division Hokkaido Asahikawa Ground 
7th Division Hokkaido Higashi Chitose Ground 
3rd Division Hyogo Senzo Ground 
8th Division Kumamoto Kita Kumanmoto Ground 
1st Division Tokyo Nerima Ground 
6th Division Yamagata Jinmachi Ground 
4th Escort Flotilla Hiroshima Kure Naval 
1st Escort Flotilla Kanagawa Yokosuka Naval 
3rd Escort Flotilla Kyoto Maizuru Naval 
2nd Escort Flotilla Nagasaki Sasebo Naval 
Major Bases of the Japanese Self Defense Forces.  Note the Naval Fleet Air Wings have 
been designated ‘Air’ units for the purposes of this study.  This is to recognize their 
impact on the base communities rather than their specific service affiliation.  Data 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense (2011, 2012a, 2012b). 
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